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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews available evidenceon the inter—industry wage structure. The inter—industrywage structure is remarkably
similar in different eras, in differentcountries, and among
different types of workers. Industries withhigh capital-to—
labor ratios, monopoly power and high profitspay relatively high wages. We conclude that the competitive model cannot without
substantial modification provide an adequateexplanation of the
inter-industry wage structure. The implications of thisfinding for micro and macro economic theory andpolicy are examined.
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(617) 495—3290 (617) 495—2447The pattern of inter—industrywage differentials appears to be one
of the mostpervasiveregularities generated by capitalist economies.
Consistently, the differentials are substantial withmanufacturing
industries paying on the order of 20 percent more thanservice
industries for comparable workers.The wage structure is amazingly
parallel in looking at data for different countries or differenteras.
And it appears very similar for workers of differentages, sex, degrees
of skill, and in different occupations. Animportant objective of
economic research should be the explanation of thesepatterns. Their
pervasiveness suggests that they result from factors fundamentalto the
workings of capitalist economies which transcend the Institutional
setting in any particular time or place.
Our goal in this paper is to summarize the availableevidence on
the inter—industry wage structure, drawingon our own research and that
of others, and to suggest some of thenecessary elements in any
explanation of the wage structure. We begin in Section I bydiscussing
issues of measurement. Data on theinter—industry wage structure are
inevitably of varying quality. While recent data are available which
permit researchers to control for a wide variety of individual
attributes in assessing the wage structure, and even to look atthe
wages of individual workers who move between industries, similar data
are not available historically for the United States, oreven currently
for many other countries. It is thereforeimportant to ask whether or
not these quality controls make a significant difference inassessments
of the inter—industry wage structure. Ifso, the broad array of
evidence available on the wage structure in different timesand places—2—
must be viewed skeptically. If not, it can be used to formulate and
test alternative explanations for inter—industry wage variations.
Fortunately, it appears that controlling for measurable quality does
not have an important impact on estimates of the inter—industry wage
structure so that historical and international data appear to be
usable.
Section II takes up the question of the robustness of the wage
structure. We first show that the wage structure has been remarkably
stable in the United States over the past century. Second, we show
that the wage structure In different mature capitalist economies Is
quite similar, but that the wage structure In these nations is
different from that of Communist or less developed economies. Third,
we show that the wage structure is very similar for different types of
workers. Certain industries pay all types of workers high wages and
others paying all types of workers relatively low wages. The limited
evidence that is available suggests a similar pattern Is followed by
firms with some paying high wages within all occupational groups while
others pay low wages within all groups. We conclude our description of
the wage structure by briefly attempting to distinguish the
characteristics of high and low wage industries.
Section III considers alternative explanations for the wage
structure. We begin by asking how far the competitive labor market
model can be extended to account for observed wage patterns. The
competitive model, unlike many of the ideas that have been advanced in
discussions of wage patterns, is coherent in the sense that the
motivations of workers and firms are clearly articulated and their—3—
behavioris derived as a function of the constraintsthey face. The
competitive model has also shown its ability to explain anenormous
variety of phenomena and to make an abundance ofempirically verifiable
predictions. Where it can be made plausible, it is farpreferable as
an explanation for labor market behavior on thegrounds of its past
success as well as Occam's Razor. Unfortunately, we are led to
conclude that the competitive model cannot withoutsubstantial
modification provide a plausible explanation ofinter—industry wage
variations.
The principal question that any non—competitiveexplanation of the
wage structure must face is why firms paying high wages do not cut
their wages. There are only two logicalanswers to this question.
First, firms may find that cutting wages is unprofitable becauseit
affects worker performance in someway. This idea forms the basis for
efficiency wage theories.Second, it is possible that firms do not
try always act so as to maximize profits at least whenpaying high
wages is an alternative. We conclude that industry wage differentials
reflect in large part rent sharing between firms andworkers,and endure
because the payment of high wages is notvery costly for firms for
efficiency wage reasons.
Section IV concludes the paper by discussing thesignificance of
inter—industry wage variations for micro and macro economic theory.
The close analogy between the problems ofinvoluntary unemployment and
inter—industry wage variations is developed in some detail and the
challenge that wage differentials pose to common conviction that
markets work well determining the composition of output is stressed.I. Labor QualitY Controls and the Industry Wage Structure
An obvious issue in considering the inter—industry wage
structure is labor quality. To the extent that different industries
employ workers with different skill levels, thereis little reason to
expect that average wages will be equalized. This problemmakes the
interpretation of data on average wages in differentindustries
somewhat problematic. This is unfortunate since a wealth of such data
are available for different historical periodsand different countries.
In this section we examine the extent to which naive calculations of
average wages are misleading as to the payment practicesof different
industries.
Our approach is to compare the inter—industry wage structure that
would be estimated from looking only at average industry wages,with
the estimated wage structure that results from the estimation of
econometric wage equations which control for a variety of worker
characteristics including age, sex, marital status, race, education,
location, and job tenure. A finding that the wage structureestimated
without controls parallelled the wage structure estimated with controls
would suggest that crude average wages may not be too misleading as
indicators of the wage structure, while a finding that controlling had
a large impact on the estimated inter—industry wagestructure would
suggest the opposite conclusion.
Our comparison draws on data from the i981 Current Population
Survey (CPS) and follows the procedures described in Kruegerand—5-.
Summers (1986). Column (1) of'Table1 reports the proportionate
difference in wages between the average worker inan industry and the
weighted average worker in all industries. For comparison column (2)
reports proportionate industry wage differences aftercontrolling for
education, age, occupation, gender, race, union status, marital status,
region, and SMSA, and allowing several of the coefficients to differ
for men and women.lIt is clear that the addition of these controls
barely alters the ranking of industry wage differences. Indeed the
correlation of the industry wage differentials estimated withand
without controls is .95.
While controlling for worker characteristics has relatively little
impact on the rankings of different industries, it does reduce
significantly the estimated inter—industry dispersion ofwages. The
standard deviation of the estimated industry wage premia falls from 2%
when no controls are present to 15% when they are included.In large
part this decline results from controlling for occupation and sex. The
general conclusion seems to be that observed differences inaverage
wages between industries do result partially from differences in labor
quality with higher wage industries tending to attract higher quality
workers.
The finding that controlling for observed productivity
characteristics of workers in micro data does not change the pattern of
wage differences allows for the comparison of industry wages over time
and across countries with aggregate industry wage data since it is
1Results reported hereare based on a sample that includes full and
part—time privately employed nonagricultural workers. Results were
qualitatively similar when the sample was narrowed to nonunion workers







Mining .14011 (.0113) .262 (.036)
Construction .216 (.0211) .153 (.022)
Ordnance '344 (.11111) .114 (.118)
Lumber —.027 (.053) .0118 (.0115)
Furniture —.098 (.063) —.033 (.052)
Stone and Clay .357 (.061) .082 (.051)
Primary Metals .357 (.0118) .179 (.0141)
Machinery Exel. Elec. .335 (.028) .187 (.025)
Electrical Mach. .185 (.030) .105 (.027)
Transport Equipment .370 (.030) .189 (.027)
Instruments .232 (.051) .131 (.0112)
Misc. Manufacturing .0014 (.066) .001 (.0511)
Food .085 (.036) .072 (.031)
Tobacco .356 (.213) .2911 (.173)
Textile —.1111 (.0118) —.022 (.0111)
Apparel —.327 (.037) —.156 (.033)
Paper .2111 (.050) .126 (.0112)
Printing .119 (.035) .083 (.029)
Chemical .362 (.041) .238 (.0311)
Petroleum .5911 (.094) .382 (.077)
Rubber .038 (.051) .035 (.0113)
Leather _.2145 (.075) —.126 (.062)
Other Transport .266 (.033) .161 (.028)
Communications .353 (.035) .1911 (.030)
Public Utilities .527 (.039) .287 (.033)
Wholesale Trade .171 (.026) .065 (.022)
Eating and Drinking _.5011 (.022) —.188 (.022)
Other Retail .2111 (.013) —.156 (.081)
Banking .084 (.026) .077 (.023)
Insurance .105 (.026) .080 (.022)
Private Household —.776 (.038) —.367(.101)
Business Services .027 (.027) .013 (.0214)
Repair Services .004 (.0J42) —.007(.036)
Personal Services —.329 (.030) —.163 (.026)
Entertainment —.181 (.043) —.143(.036)
Medical Services —.183 (.026) —.073 (.0214)
Hospitals .1113 (.025) .064 (.023)
Welfare Services —.1911 (.032) —.2511 (.028)
Education Services —.052 (.032) —.189 (.029)
Professional Services .225 (.031) .071 (.027)
Weighted
Standard Deviation .240 .146
of Differentials b
Notes:a) Controls include education and its square, 6 age
dummies, 8 occupation dummies, sex dummy, race dummy, central
city dummy, union member dummy, ever married dummy, veteran
status, marriage *sex,education *sex,education squared '
sexd,and 6 age ftsexinteractions. Sample size is 10,289.
b) Weights are employment shares for each year.—6—
unlikely that controls would change the pattern of industry wages in
these data. The next section relies on this finding to draw
conclusions based on aggregate data on the wage structure over time and
across countries. It is of course conceivable that differences in
average wages across industries reflect differences in unzneasurable
rather than measurable aspects of labor quality. At thisstage, we
remain agnostic regarding this issue to which we will return in Section
III, and claim only that the crude average data we examine are
representative of the results that would be obtained if it were
possible to control for measurable aspects of workers' productivity
such as schooling and experience.
II. Regularities in the Inter—industry Wage Structure
This section examines evidence on the inter—industrywage
structure and documents its extreme stability across time and space.
It then goes on to show that wage differentials are similar for
different types of workers and to relate wage patterns to industry
characteristics.We defer interpretation of the observed patterns to
the next section.
Wage Differentials Over Time
The stability of relative wages within the manufacturing sector of the
economy has been noted many times. Slichter's (1950) classic work on
the topic illustrates the constancy of the industrywage structure.—7—
Slichter examined hourly wage data for unskilled males from the
National Industrial Conference Board establishment surveys of twenty
manufacturing industries in the U.S. from 1923 to 19116.He found a
rank correlation of industry wages over this time period of' .73. From
this Sliebter concluded that "the inter—industry structure of wages has
considerable stability during short or moderately short periods of
time. "2
Although comparisons over long periods of time are difficult
because of changes in industry definitions, we have extended Slichter's
analysis of manufacturing data by matching the 1923 Conference Board
data that Slichter analyzed to industry wage differentials estimated
from the May 19811 CPS reported in column (2) of Table 1.A plot of the
1923 wage differentials against the 19811 industry wage differentials is
presented in Figure 1.The plot shows that relatively high wage
industries in 1923 such as auto manufacturing continued to be high wage
industries in 19811, and low wage industries such as boot and shoe
manufacturing continued to be low wage industries in 19811The
correlation of industry wages in 19811 and 1923 is .56. Since this
correlation is probably an underestimate due to changes in industry
definitions and sampling error, we consider this evidence that the wage
structure has remained relatively stable for a very long time.
Data on manufacturing wages refer only to a relatively small
and dwindling part of the economy. In 1985, less than 20 percent of
the labor force was working in the manufacturing sector. One of the
often claimed regularities in the wage structure is the tendency for
Cullen (1956) reaches a similar conclusion from analyzing data on
annual earnings for 76 manufacturing Industries between 1899 and 1950.—8—
manufacturing firms to pay high wages generally, while service sector
firms tend to pay relatively low wages. For these reasons, it is
useful even at the cost of some sacrifice in data quality to examine
information on the economy—wide wage structure.
In Table 2 we present correlations of log annual earnings of full
time equivalent employees in 9 maJor industries for selectedyears
between 19811 and 1900 and the standard deviation of industry wages in
these years.3 The industry wage structure for all industries has
remained remarkably constant since 1915, with correlations with the
wage structure in 19811 ranging from .76 to .98. Prior to 1920 the
pattern of industry wages was less similar to the current industry wage
structure, but the correlation is still greater than .60 between
relative wages in 1900 and 19811. Overall, it appears that the
structure of relative industry wages hardly changes over a decade, and
that it changes only moderately over much longer intervals.
Researchers have noted the stationarity of the industry in
other countries as well. Tarling and Wilkinson (1982) and Lawson
(1982) remark on the stability of the industry wage structure in the
United Kingdom in years after World War II. Papola and Bharadwaj
(1970) study the rank correlation of industry earnings in 17 countries.
They find a stable ranking of industry wages in developed countries but
a less stable pattern of industry wages in less developed countries.
The limited evidence suggests that stability in the industry wage
structure is a universal phenomenon in industrialized capitalist
countries.
3The nine industries includeagriculture, manufacturing, mining,
construction, transportation, communications, wholesale and retail

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Turning to the dispersion In Industry wages, the data In Table
2 suggest that the industry wage dispersion fluctuates somewhat over
time. However, there is not a tendency for the industrywage structure
to increase or decrease over time. This is consistent with previous
research such as that of H.G. Lewis (1963) demonstrating that over the
very long run the dispersion in relative industry wage differences In
the U.S. displays no trend but that in the short run, dispersion tends
to be counter—cylical, increasing in economic downturns and decreasing
during upturns. Lewis found that the greatest dispersion in annual
compensation of full—time workers among industries occurred in 1932
during the height of the Great Depression, while the lowest standard
deviation was during the post—World War II recovery period. Over the
thirty year span that he studied, however, Lewis concluded there was no
secular trend in the dispersion of industry wages.k
Overall, the available information suggests that industry wage
structure is very stable with the extent of variation but the
ranking of individual industries changing through time.
International Wage Structure ComDprispns
The U.S. has unique institutions and history. If thewage
differentials discussed above are due to the particular institutions of
the U.S. economy we would not expect to find a similar pattern ofwage
Waehter's (1970)analysis of the cyclical nature of the industry wage
structure also finds evidence of a counter—cyclical dispersion in
industry wages. Bell and Freeman (1985), however, find evidence of a
noncyclical upturn in the dispersion of wages in manufacturing
Industries in the 1970's.Table 2: Industry Wage Structure Through Time
Comparison of Log Annual Earnings of Full-Time






















Notes: Data are reported in Historical Statistics of the US and
various issues of SurvyofCurrent Business. Industries include
agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation,
communications, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE, and services.—10—
differences in other countries. On the other hand, if diverse
countries have 8imilar wage structures we have evidence thata common
thread across all countries, such as technology or marketstructure, is
responsible for these wage differences. In this section we address the
issue of whether the structure of wages is the same in all countries.
There have been several comparative studies of theindustry
wage structure in different countries. In the first of these studies,
Lebergott (1917), compared industry wage rankings in six countries.
Only annual income data for manufacturing industries in a few countries
were available at the time of his study. Furthermore, he couldonly
speculate about the effect of labor quality on the industry wage
structure.
Nonetheless, Lebergott found a high rank correlation in
industry wages in the 19LO's between the U.S. and Canada, the United
Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. The U.S. and Soviet Union did not
have a high correlation among industries when all industrieswere
considered, but elimination of two industries dramatically Increased
the rank correlation. He concluded that the industrywage structure is
as similar between the U.S. and other nations as it isamong separate
regions within the U.S. Conclusions similar to Lebergott's have been
obtained by Dunlop and Rothbaum (1955) and Papola and Bharadwaj (1970).
Improved data collection in several countries In recent years
permits more detailed and comprehensive comparisons of industrialwage
structures across nations. Table 3 presents evidence on the universal
similarity in wages among manufacturing Industries in 11 countries in






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Organization's (ILO) Yearbook of Labor Statistics and describedin
greater detail in the Data Appendix.
In general, the pattern of relativewages is remarkably similar
across countries particularly when attention is confined todeveloped
capitalist economies. The correlations are quite high,typically
between .7 and •9•5 The correlation inwages between the U.S. and
other countries in 1982 was very high,ranging from .95 with England to
.33 with the Soviet Union. Eight of the 13 correlations betweenthe
U.S. and other countries are above .8, and 11are above .6. In
comparison the correlation of relative industrywage differentials in
the south and nonsouth regions of the U.S. is .91.6The industry wage
structure is roughly as similar between differentregions within the
U.S. as it is between the U.S. and other countries.
Graph 2 presents a representative plot of US industrywages
against industry wages in Japan. Both countriesclearly have a similar
industry wage structure. The transportation industry, forinstance, is
a high wage industry In both countries while theapparel and textiles
industries are examples of low wage industries in bothcountries.
In addition to the 1982 results, we examinedcorrelations among
industry earnings in 1973 for the same sample of countries.There
appears to be no trend in the correlation in industrywages between the
U.S. and other countries between 1973 and 1982. Insix countries the
correlation with the U.S. was stronger in 1982, while inseven
countries the correlation with the U.S. was weaker in1982.
5Correlations are oflog wages, which eliminates the need to adjust for
exchange rates and inflation. Results were qualitatively similarwhen
he correlations were weighted by U.S. industry employment shares.
This correlation is for all industries aftercontrolling for labor








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bolivia and Mexico stand out as countries which had dramatically
more similar wage structures in comparison to the U.S. in 1982 than in
1973. The correlation in wages between Mexico and the U.S. increased
from .16 to .81, and the correlation between Bolivia and the U.S.
increased from .20 to .51 between 1973 and 1982. The process of
development may be very important in determining the ultimate structure
of industry wages.
Tableshows that relative wage dispersion as measured by the
standard deviation in log average earnings in manufacturing industries
is substantial in all countries. In 1982 the standard deviation ranged
from a high of 31.4% in Korea to a low of 8.1% in Sweden. In general,
developed capitalist countries tend to have greater dispersion in
wages across industries than underdeveloped, socialist or communist
countries. This may reflect the greater level of human capital
attainment in the more developed capitalist countries.
Overall the available information on wage structures in different
countries suggest a similar conclusion to the historical data on wage
structures. The rankings of different industries are remarkably
stable, but there is a moderate degree of variation in the magnitude of'
industry wage differentials among countries.
Wage DifferentIals forfferent dsofrkers
Another way to gain insight into the inter—industry wage structure
is by examining how it varies across different types of workers and
plants. We find the inter—industry wage structure to be quite stableTable 4: Wage Dispersion Among Manufacturing Industries
Select Countries
Year














United Kingdom .087 .140
United States .206 .241
Yugoslavia .126 .120
See Data Appendix for description of data set. 1981 data are
used in column (2) for Bolivia, France and USSR.—13—
among workers with short and long job tenure, young and old workers,
and workers in different occupations, but some differences are apparent
across different types of firms.
Table 5, drawn from Krueger and Summers (1986), compares the
industry wage structure for several subsamples of workers. The first
four rows show that industry attachment has about the same effecton
wages of young and old workers, and workers with short and long spells
of job tenure. Whatever leads to inter—industry wage differences does
not appear to involve the recruitment of new workers or the human
capital of older ones. It also appears that there is a high correlation
between the wage structures of blue and white collar workers suggesting
that the inter—industry wage structure is not simply a reflection of
job characteristics.
Dickens and Katz (1986a) extensively examine the issue of whether
or not industry wage differentials follow similar patterns for workers
in different occupations. Their analysis reveals a remarkable
similarity in the inter—industry wage structure of different
occupational groups. For instance, they find a correlation of .86
between industry wages of laborers and managers, and .77, after
controlling for individual characteristics. The industry wage
structure is very similar for workers in radically different
occupations.
An important variable that affects wages is employer size.
Several studies have documented a positive relationship betweencompany
or establishment size and wages, even after controlling for labor
quality and working conditions (Mellow, 1982 and Brown and Medoff,114
1985).If high wage industries are composed of larger than average
firms, the industry wage structure may in part reflect the employer
size wage differential. To test the importance of firm size in
determining industry wages, we analyze the industry wage structure
separately for workers in small firms (less than 100 employees) and
large firms (more than 1,000 employees). We find a high correlation
between industry wage differentials In small and large firms, but the
dispersion in industry wages Is significantly lower among workers in
small firms.
A related Issue to firm size is self employment. The self
employed are the ultimate swall firm. Despite the fact that skills are
likely to be diverse among the self employed and the substantial errors
in reporting self—employment, inter—industry wage variations are about
one—quarter smaller among the self employed than among other workers.
Again, however, there is a high correlation between industry wage
differentials of the self employed and other workers.
Additional evidence on the similarity of wage structures for
different types of workers comes from data on different establishments
in a single industry. Groshen (1986) reports evidence that
establishments tend either to pay high or low wages to all occupational
groups .
•TLeonard(1986) finds weak evidence of a positive correlation between
wages in different occupations across establishments in the "high
technology" sector. For instance, the correlation of receptionists'
and light truck operators' wages across establishments was .35.
However, Leonard did not find a statistically significant correlation
of wages between occupations in nearly half of the occupation pairs he
studied.Table 5: The Inter—Industry Wage Structure






(1) Age 20—35 .139
(2) Age 50-65 .134
.85
Tenure
(3) Tenure 1 .087
(4) Tenure >10 .096
.75
Firm Size
(5) 1—99 Employees .073
(6) 1,000 or More Employees .iii
.78
Types of Employment
(7) Self Employed .097
(8) Privately Employed .133
.84
Occupation
(9) Blue Collar .126
(10) White Collar
.63
aROWS (7) and (8) areunweighted; all other rows are weighted by 1984
employment.
bComplement is the otherreported subsample. Correlations are not adjusted for sampling variation.
CCti are the sameas in Table 1. Year dummies were also included inrows
(7) and (8).
dsampie sizes for rows(1) through (10), respectively, are 4,932, 1,811,
5,116, 1,619, 3,752, 3,497, 3,378, 46,232, 3,959, and6,335. Rows (1), (2),
(7) and (8) are 1984 CPS. Rows (3) through (6)are 1979 CPS. Rows (7) and (8)
are May 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 CPS.—15—
By applying analysis of variance techniques, Groshen is able to
attribute the share of individual wage variation that 18dueto several
factors. She then divides the total variation in wages that is due to
each source. Most importantly, she controls for narrow occupational
grades, gender and region. Table 6 reports some results of this
analysis. The table shows that establishment is an important factor in
the dispersion of wages, even after controlling for occupation and
occupation—establishment interaction. In the Industrial Chemicals
industry, for instance, establishment effects alone result in a 13%
standard deviation of wages. In comparison, occupation, gender, region
and form of payment contribute 9% to the standard deviation in wages.
The total standard deviation in wages for workers in the Industrial
Chemicals industry is 17%.
Why are wages so strongly affected by establishment controls?
Groshen finds that establishment characteristics, including size,
region, major product, proportion male, technology and payment method,
can explain about half of the establishment effects. However, there is
a substantial amount of idiosyncratic variation in wages among
establishments. These findings at the establishment level suggest that
some establishments pay high wages for workers for workers of a given
quality and others pay low wages for workers of the same quality.
Characteristics of High and Low WagJndustries
Several researchers have studied the characteristics associated
with high and low wage industries. Here we review the evidence on twoa Table 6: Estimated Standard Deviations of Wages in Various Classes
Industrial Wool Shirts CottonStruct. SIMPLE PlasticsChemicalsTextiles and Textiles Steel MEAN Source
________fghtwear
Occupation, Sex
Region& Incent. .18 .09 .09 .09 .10 .17 .12
Establishment .14 .13 .11 .09 .06 .13 .11
Interaction .09 .05 .05 .07 .05 .07 .06
Individual .07 .03 .09 .14 .10 .04
TOTAL .25 .17 .18 .20 .16 .18 .19
I
log
a For instance, in the Plastics industry, the standard deviation
across establishments is 18%, controlling for occupation, sex, region and
form of payment (incent.). The total standard deviation is the standard
deviation in log wages in across all workers without controls.
We are grateful to Erica Groshen for allowing us to present this table
which is drawn from her dissertation.-.16-.
key factors ——theindustry's ability to pay high wages and union
density. A comprehensive survey of the relationship between wages and
several industry characteristics is provided in Dickens and Katz
(1986b) in this volume.
Table 7 summarizes select empirical estimates of the relationship
between an industry's ability to pay high wages and the wage structure.
Indirect measures have been used to proxy for an industry's ability to
pay high wages. The table reports the change in wages associated with
a two standard deviation change in each measure of the industry's
ability to pay.
The nature of the product market affects a firm's competitiveness,
with firms in monopolistic or oligopolistic industries insulated from
market pressure that accompanies a policy of paying supra—competitive
wages. Several studies have examined the effect of product market
structure on wages.Market structure is typically measured by the
four firm concentration ratio, degree of import penetration, and
barriers to entry. In general, there is some evidence that less
competitive industries pay higher wages, though this finding is
sensitive to the extent of labor quality controls.
Weiss (1966) finds industry concentration to have a large impact
on wages. A two standard deviation increase in the concentration
ratio, for instance, is associated with a 17.5% increase in annual
income. Weiss further finds that the concentration rate has a greater
impact on wages for nonunion employees than union employees. When he
adds labor quality controls and additional industry controls, however,
the effect of the concentration ratio becomes insignificant.—17—
Similarly, Pugel (1980) finds that the concentration ratio becomes
statistically insignificant once labor quality controls are added to
the model. However, Kwoka (1983), Mishel (1982) and Dickens and Katz
(1986b) find that the concentration ratio has an important effecton
wages even after controlling for individual human capital.
Furthermore, Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) find that the change in the
concentration ratio has a large effect on the change inwages. Since
tine—invariant industry hunan capital will net out in the change
specification, Lawrence and Lawrence's analysis suggests that the
concentration ratio has an independent effect on wages.
An alternative measure of an industry's ability to pay is economic
profit. This variable, although difficult to quantify, has the
advantage of taking in account other input costs, such as materials.
One disadvantage of using the observed profit rate as a measure of
ability to pay is that profit is necessarily reduced as wages increase.
Therefore the relationship between the profit rate andwages will
understate the strength of the true relationship between ability topay
and wages. Nonetheless, Sliebter (1950), Pugel (1980), and Dickens and
Katz (1986b) find that the profit rate has a strong relationship with
average wages in manufacturing industries. Furthermore, in terms of
two standard deviation changes in the independent variable, the profit
rate has a greater effect on wages than the concentration ratio.Pugel
finds that additional labor quality controls tend to attenuate the
effect of the profitability on earnings. More profitable industries
tend to use some of their rents to hire better quality labor, and share
some of their rents with their workers.—18—
Sliohter (1950) and Dunlop (19118) were among the first economists
to analyze the relationship between labor's share of costs in an
industry and average wages. The general conclusion of their analysis
is that wages are inversely related to labor's share of coats. This
finding is even more remarkable when one considers the simultaneity
bias involved, since labor's share necessarily increases with the
average wage rate, holding the level of employment constant. This
result is significant for two reasons. First, it follows from
Marshall's laws of demand that labor's share of total cost is
positively related to the elasticity of labor demand under assumptions
likely to be met in the economy. The elasticity of labor, in turn,
determines the trade—off between wages and employment. Second,
increased waaes have a sualler inpact on profits if labor's share is
small.
A related issue is the relationship between the capital—to—labor
ratio and average industry wages. If capital is plentiful relative to
labor, the firm's profit is less affected by wage increases. Recent
studies by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) and Dickens and Katz (1986b)
support the conclusion that the capital—labor ratio is positively
related to wages in an industry.Workers in more capital intensive
industries are paid higher wages, all else the same.
Lastly, Dickens and Katz (1986b) and Garbaririo (1950) present
evidence suggesting that union density is positively correlated with
industry wages for both union and nonunion employees.8 Additional
SFreeman and Medoff (1981) find evidence to thecontrary for nonunion
employees in micro data. They do not find a statistically significant
relationship between the union density in an industry or region and
wages for a sample of nonunion employees, controlling for individual
characteristics.Table 7: Survey of Selected Studies on Wages andProfitability
A. Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR)
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1. Sllchtere (1950) 21.3%'
16.7%'
3. Pugel (1980) 27.8%'
13.2%'Notes:
a. The actual SD of the independent variable was used whenever it was
reported; when not reported, the SD in CR, K/L or profit rate was
assumed to be .1l$6, .170, and .031, respectively. X/L is measured in
1000's of 1972 dollars. These are the SD's in Dickens and Katz
(1986b).
b. Weiss uses a linear specification. Percentage change is in mean
annual earnings.
c. Authors' calculations from Dickens and Katz (1986b), using the
formula b [corr (x,y) ]EC,
d.Lawrence and Lawrence use a log—log specification. A semi—
elasticity was derived by dividing the estimated elasticity by the mean
capital—labor ratio.
e. Autbors'oalculations from data reported in Slichter (1950).
*Statisticallysignificant at 10% level.—19—
evidence on the relationship between wages and union density is in
Podgursky (1982), which analyzes CPS micro data. Podguraky finds that
the proportion of workers in an industry that are covered by union
contracts has a large effect on wages of nonunion workers in large
establishments, but little effect on wages of workers in small
establishments.
It is by no means clear, however, that the observed relationship
between unionization rates and industry wages represents a causal
relationship. Historical evidence suggests that high wage industries
already paid relatively high wages before the advent of wide—scale
unionization in manufacturing. For instance, the Big Three automobile
manufacturers in the US were wage leaders prior to successful
organization of General Motors and Chrysler in 1937 and Ford In 19U1.9
Furthermore, unions have tended to concentrate their organizing efforts
in industries which have a greater ability to pay high wages, and these
industries appear to share their rents with unorganized workers
anyway.lO Lastly, International evidence shows that the industry wage
structure Is similar In countries where there is not a threat of unions
and in countries where there is widespread collective bargaining. All
of this suggests that union density Is a correlate of industry wage
differentials, but probably not an underlying determinant of the
Industry wage structure.
9iernsteln (1976) provides an excellentsurvey of the unionization of
the Auto Industry and of the effects of unions on wages and working
8ndItions in the Auto industry.
Kwoka (1983) and others find that industry concentration has a
greater effect on wages for nonunion than union workers. This finding
implIes that even in the absence of unions firms tend to share their
monopoly rents with their workers.—20—
There is some evidence that the characteristics associated with
high wage industries in the 1970's and 1980's were associated with high
wage industries throughout the twentieth—century. Slichter's (1950)
analysis of the rank correlations between industry wages in 1939 and
several variables led him to conclude that ability to pay as measured
by labor's share and profit margin was the key determinant of industry
wages. This finding is supported by Katz's (1986) more sophisticated
econometric analysis of the 1939 Conference Board Data. Garbarino
(1950) also finds evidence of a strong relationship between industry
concentration and wages. Furthermore, Katz (1986) and Garbarino (1950)
find weak evidence that high wage industries were more highly unionized
than low wage industries in the 1930's and 1910's.
III. Implications of the Evidence
The evidence in the preceding section indicates the presence of
pervasive regularities in the wage structure. A similar industrial
pattern of wages recurs in different eras and different places and for
workers with very different characteristics. Such a uniform pattern
ought to be explicable without resort to highly idiosyncratic factors
specific to specific workers, industries, times or places. This
section discusses possible explanations for the observed patterns. It
concludes that they cannot plausibly be rationalized without the
introduction of non—competitive considerations or additional
constraints, but remains agnostic as to just what factors lead to
inter—industry differences in wages.—21—
ComDetitive Explanations
The competitive model has helped economists to understand an
enormous range of phenomenon and has all the attributes of good theory.
It offers clear predictions as to how firms and workers will behave
given the constraints they face and how the interactions of worker and
firm behavior will combine to determine equilibrium wages and levels of
employment. The theory is specific enough to make falsifiable
predictions while at the same time general enough to be applicable In a
wide variety of settings. Where plausible competitive explanations of
economic phenomena can be provided, they are to be preferred both on
the grounds of simplicity, and because of the discipline the
competitive model requires. We therefore begin by considering
competitive explanations for the wage structure.
Competitive theory offers two broad classes of explanation for the
finding that workers with the same measurable characteristics are paid
different wages in different industries. Differentials may reflect
differences in unmeasured labor quality or may compensate for non—
pecuniary differences in job attributes. In either case wage
differentials do not signal opportunities for firms to increase profits
by reducing wages for they would find themselves unable to hire workers
of the same quality at reduced wages.Refutation of these ideas is
difficult since they postulate that it is unobserved characteristics of
workers and jobs which give rise to the observed wage structure.
Nonetheless our reading of the available evidence is that it is—22—
difficult to convincingly account for the wage structure on the basis
of unobserved quality differentials or compensating differentials.
It is obvious that unobserved quality differences account for much
of the variation in the wages that workers with different
characteristics receive.Surely much of the variation in the wages of
different workers reflects differences in their productivity. At
issue however, is whether differences in the pverage wage paid in
different industries can be traced to differences in the average level
of unobserved quality. Four types of evidence suggest to us that it is
unlikely that a large part of unobserved wage differentials reflect
differences in labor quality.
First, if industries hired workers of differing quality because of
differences in their technology, one would expect that controlling for
measurable correlates of quality would tend to reduce industry wage
differentials. However Krueger and Summers (1986) report that after
controlling for sex and occupation, adding controls for tenure, age and
education to a wage equation reduces the standard deviation of industry
wage differentials by less than 10 percentage points. Unless
unmeasured aspects of labor quality are only very weakly correlated
with tenure, age and education, and are far more important than
measurable aspects, it is hard to see how they could account for inter-
industry wage differences.
Second, Krueger and Summers (1986) and Vroman (1978) present
longitudinal evidence of wage differences which closely parallel those-.23—
found in the data presented in the preceding section.11 When
individual workers move between industries their ability presumably
does not change but their wages do change by amounts similar to the
industry effects estimated in cross sectional data. Furthermore, the
estimated wage gain from entering an industry is not significantly
different from the estimated wage loss from leaving it, suggesting that
the selection biases are not confounding the longitudinal results.
Third, the available evidence suinn1arized above suggests that the
pattern of inter—industry wage differentials is very similar for
different types of workers. There is little apriorl reason to expect
that clerical workers with high unmeasured labor quality should be
complementary with manual workers with high unmeasured labor across
industries even if unmeasured labor quality is important in determining
wages. If differences in unmeasured labor quality were of paramount
importance one would expect the magnitude of inter—industry wage
differentials to be greatest for older more experienced workers for
whom selection could be much more perfect and this also is not
observed.
11We note, however, the contrasting findingsby Murphy and Topel in
this volume which suggest that most of the observed industry wage
differences are due to unobserved Individual components. There are two
riajor differences between Murphy and Topel's analysis and previous
longitudinal studies that might account for their different findings.
The first difference stems from the treatment of measurement error.
Murphy and Topel use an instrumental variable procedure to avoid
measurement error bias while Krueger and Summers (1986) adjust OLS
results for measurement error, and Vrornan analyzes employer—reported
data which are less likely to be contaminated by measurement error.
Second, Murphy and Topel focus on changes in occupation—industry cells
while others have examined just industry effects. It is possible that
unobserved worker specific differences affect observed occupation wage
differences but not observed industry wage differences.Fourth, the evidence surveyed in the preceding section indicates
that there are strong regularities in the pattern of industrialwages.
More profitable industries, those with more monopoly power, and those
where labor's share is smaller pay higher wages. These regularities
appear to be statistically significant to hold in different times and
places, and to account for a fairly large fraction of inter—industry
wage variations. If unmeasured labor quality were the correct
explanation for inter—industry wage differences, one would not expect
to be able to explain wage differentials with variables reflecting
product market characteristics so their significance casts doubt on the
unmeasured quality explanation for wage differentials12 These four
considerations lead to us to doubt that unmeasured quality is the
proper explanation for inter—industry wage differentials.
The second competitive explanation for wage differentials can be
disposed of more briefly. The last two points made with respect to the
unmeasured quality argument apply equally well to the compensating
differentials argument. More importantly, the available empirical
evidence suggests that differentials are exacerbating rather than
compensating. Krueger and Summers (1986) provide evidence that the
extent of industry wage differences is increased by about one fourth
when fringe benefits are taken into consideration. They further show
that controlling for a number of job attributes tends if anything to
2One could try tosalvage the unmeasured quality argument by pointing
to capital skill complementarities. Note however that the only
available evidence that such complementarities exist is based on
measurable aspects of quality, and that wages are correlated with other
industry characteristics even when the capital labor ratio is held
constant. Summers (1986) discusses some historical evidence suggesting
that increased capital intensity substituted for skilled workers in
automobile manufacturing.—25—
increase estimates of the extent of inter—industry wage variation.A
final piece of evidence against the hypothesis of compensating
differentials is the finding reported in Pencavel (1970) and confirmed
by Krueger and Summers (1986) that high wage industries have lower quit
rates than low wage industries. There would be no reason to expect
this pattern if wage differentials simply compensated for differences
in the non—pecuniary attributes of jobs.
Non Cowoetitive Theories
The central task of any non—competitive explanation for inter—
industry wage differentials is to explain why high wage industries and
firms do not cut their wages. Only two answers to this question are
logically admissible. Either firms would find that reducing wages
would reduce profits, or they choose not to maximize profits.
Economists have a strong preference for the first answer, that firms
profit maximize but there are reasons to believe that considerations
other than profit maximization influence the wage structure.We
consider these first and then turn to profit maximizing explanations
for the observed industry wage structure
The most plausible argument that firms pay wages higher than would
be consistent with profit maximization invoke agency problems involved
in monitoring managers. In his seminal study of inter—industry wage
differences, Sliobter (1950) treats inter—industry wage differences as
being the result of "managerial policy". Managers may well have
objectives other than maximization of shareholder wealth and—26—
shareholders may find it difficult to monitor and/or control their
behavior. Lee lacoeca's recent assertion that "the chairman [of a
publicly held company] is morally accountable to his employees and
stockholders" is revealing in this regard (p.1OlI). Even if top
management is dedicated to the maximization of shareholder wealth, the
middle level managers who set wages are likely to internalize the
welfare of their subordinates as well as that of shareholders. This
may explain the common observation that managers are prone to inflate
their employees' performance ratings. Lastly, in a study of one of the
famous instances of' a firm's choosing a high wage policy, Summers
(1986) examines the circumstances surrounding Henry Ford's introduction
of the five dollar day in 1914 and concludes that the enormous prior
profitability of the Ford company exerted an important influence.
It is noteworthy that high wages tend to be paid in industries that
are concentrated, have high profits, and have relatively small labor
shares. Postulating that managers maximize a utility function which
includes both profits and the well being of their workers generates
exactly these predictions.. Where firms face inelastic product demand
curves, the cost of raising wages would be reduced.High profits
would make achieving other goals more attractive.The cost of raising
workers wages would be lower where the labor share was smaller. The
rent sharing view is also consistent with the observation that high
wage industries reward all types of workers about equally, despite wide
differences in their backgrounds and job characteristics..
Casual empiricism about the situations where wage concessions are
granted also suggests the importance of rent sharing. It is perhaps—27—
revealing that industries which are in serious trouble succeed in
extracting wage concessions from workers located both in parts of the
country where the labor market is strong, and where it is weak. On the
other hand, employers in profitable industries never ask for or get
wage concessions from employees working in regions where there is high
unemployment. Another example of' the importance of rent sharing in the
determination of wages is provided by deregulation of airlines.
Competitive theory might lead one to expect that this would increase
the wages of airline workers as reduced ticket prices increased the
demand for airline flights.Yet the experience even at nonunion
airlines that have grown under deregulation is that wages have fallen
significantly.
The positive relationship between wages and firm size has been
noted many times. Most recently Brown and Medoff (1985) have
demonstrated the existence of' substantial size wage effects even after
controlling for worker quality and compensating differentials. It is
reasonable to assume that agency considerations are most important in
the large establishments that pay the highest wages.
The hypothesis that firms set wages to achieve objectives other
than profit maximization encounters an obvious problem. While it is
plausible that some or even most managers might pursue goals other than
profit maximization, it is hard to believe that all managers do so.
Why do not firms managed by profit maximizers drive the others out of
business? An obvious answer that may contribute to the explanation of
the linkages between wages and concentration is that there are barriers
to entry in some industries, and so managers who are prepared to pay—28-.
low wages cannot enter. Where firms have marketpower, they can afford
the luxury of some inefficiency.
This consideration is probably not sufficient to explain howfirms
that pay high wages endure. To some extent, the payment ofhigher
wages must yield benefits to firms beyond the warm glow it gives
managers. The feature common to all efficiency wage theories is that
over some range increases in wages raise the profits that firms earn.13
Before considering specific reasons why paying highwages might
prove profitable, and how their importance might differ across
industries, it is useful to note the interaction between efficiency
wage ideas and the rent sharing ideas discussed above.14 If efficiency
wage considerations are important, changes in wages will have much less
than proportionate effects on firms' costs because of theresulting
changes in productivity. This will make indulging a taste for paying
high wages less costly. Indeed, starting at the profit maximizingwage
level, the cost of indulging a taste for high wages slightly would be
zero as argued by Akerlof and Yellen (1984) and in a somewhat different
context by Bulow and Summers (1986).
We have stressed the rent sharing aspect of wage setting asan
explanation for differences in the inter—industry wage structure
because of the difficulty of accounting In any otherway for the
similarity in the wage pattern for all different types of workers.
13Note that even ina competitive model, firms can increase profits by
increasing wages. Below a certain wage level, firms cannot attract
labor and so increasing wages raise profits. The distinguishing
characteristic of' efficiency wage models is a continuous non—inonotonic
relationship between wages and profits.
Katz (1986) provides a thorough survey of the efficiencywage
literature and evaluation of available empirical evidence.—29—
Efficiency wage models based on turnover, or the problem of effort
elicitation would predict that wage patterns would differ across jobs
that varied in the amount of specific human capital they required or in
the ease with which workers could be monitored. Models based on
selection effects would also predict that inter—industry wage patterns
would differ for workers holding different types of jobs.
An explanation alternative to rent sharing would hold that firms
pay efficiency wages in some job categories and then face horizontal
equity constraints which lead them to pay higher wages even to workers
doing jobs where efficiency wage elements are not important. Frank
(1985) makes a persuasive case for the importance of such horizontal
equity effects. They immediately raise the question of what enforces
the horizontal equity constraints. What sanction leads firms to pay
horizontally equitable wages? The only plausible answer to this
question is the threat that workers who feel unfairly treated will
withhold effort. But once this effect is admitted, it is hard to see
why workers do not evaluate the fairness of their wage package on the
basis of how the firm is doing as well as how other workers fare. This
idea is developed in a formal efficiency wage model by Akerloff (1981).
This last possibility provides an additional explanation for rent
sharing by firms. It may be the case that managers reward workers with
a share of the rents earned by the firm not because they want to but
instead because of the threat that workers will withhold effort.
Failure to pay "fair" wages may then reduce profits by undermining
worker morale. It is likely to be difficult to distinguish empirically
managers' desire to pay high wages from their response to the potential—30-.
sanctionof withheld effort. But in the end the distinction may not be
an important one. In either case, the appropriate theory of wage
setting involves the determination of fair wages.
Our conclusion is that the industry wage structure reflects firms'
sharing of rents with workers. These rents may be the result of
monopoly power, returns to intangible assets, or returns to capital
that is already in place. Where rents per workers are greatest,wage
rates tend to be highest. Rent sharing Is much less costly than it
might first appear because efficiency wage considerations cause wage
increases to result in much less than proportional increases in labor
costs. Particularly in environments where efficiency wage
considerations are important, this makes it possible for firms paying
high wages to survive. Whether firms share rents because of managers
desire to help workers, or because of the threat that workers will
withhold effort Is an open question. In all likelihood both elements
are present In most settings.
IV, Conclusions
Our conclusion that the inter—industry wage structure cannot
plausibly be interpreted as a competitive outcome has significance for
both micro and macroeconomic Issues. It undermines the classical
presumption that markets allocate output in an optimal fashion and
makes meaningful the claims of some critics of laissez faire that some
industries are better candidates for policy encouragement than others.
And since involuntary unemployment can be regarded as confinement to—31—
the low wage home production sector of the economy, a finding of
significant non—competitive inter—industry wage variations renders
plausible claims that economies are subject to chronic involuntary
unemployment and casts doubt on the equilibrating properties of the
free market. The remainder of this section develops these two points
in more detail.
The standard argunent that the free market allocates labor
optimally is easily stated. Firms hire labor to the point where wages
equal margInal products. Competition Insures that all firms pay
workers of a given type an equal wage. It follows immediately that the
marginal product of workers in all industries is equalized. An
argumentof this kind lies behind standard treatments of the
desirability of free markets and free trade. One of the principal
recognized exceptions to the rule that free markets allocate resources
optimally, is the case where wages cannot vary freely and therefore are
not equalized across sectors of the economy. In this case as many
authors have recognized there is an argument for subsidizing high wage
industries so that they expand to the point where the marginal product
of labor equals its opportunity cost rather than its wage.
Economists have always regarded this argument as suspect. Where
the wage in a sector is increased by government action, or collective
action by workers, there is always the view that subsidies are very
much second best to removing the wage distortion. They are second best
in both the technical sense that the subsidized outcome does not
correspond to an optimal allocation of resources, and in the broader
sense that the level of wage distortions is likely to be increased if
policy makers consistently subsidize high wage industries.—32—
The finding that competitive economies give rise to substantial
inter—industry wage variations even where the government does not
intervene and unions are not present suggests that subsidiesmay not
always represent an inferior second best policy. Where equilibrium
wage differentials arise from considerations having to do with
motivating workers, selecting them, or their bargaining power as
insiders, they may be ineradicable. Furthermore, in at least some
circumstances it would not be desirable to eradicate them even if it
were possible. Consider for example the case where firms in some
industries pay above market wages in order to induce workers not to
shirk as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (19814) and Bulow and Summers (1986).
Eliminating wage differentials would make it impossible for firms to
elicit effort from their workers arid would obviously be inefficient.
In circumstances where eradicating wage differentials is impossible or
undesirable, subsidies become the first best policy for increasing
economic welfare.l5
Identifying a market failure is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the desirability of policy intervention. Feasible policy
interventions may carry with them collateral costs sufficiently large
so as to outweigh the benefits. The political process may not permit
welfare enhancing policies to be undertaken even where they are
feasible. We have little to contribute to the discussion of the
political aspects of industrial policies beyond the observation that in
rent sharing models, it is not obvious whether firms are likely to
be operating on their labor demand curves as presumed in the argument
presented here. The question which we are unable to resolve here
depends on how the firm determines the set of workers with whom rents
are to be shared.—33—
themodern world, public non—involvement is probably a meaningless
benchmark: government decisions that will inevitable be made do affect
the composition of output. Two potential collateral costs of subsidies
to high wage industries ——theirapparently antiegalitarian character
and the rent seeking that they may generate are examined in Bulow and
Summers (1986) and Summers (1986) with the conclusion that they
probably do not vitiate the case for at least small subsidies to high
wage industries.
The fInding oflarge inter—Industry wage differentials has
significant implicationsfor macroeconomic as well as microeconomic
theory.It has become fashionable in recent years to denounce
involuntaryunemployment as a meaningless concept. Lucas (1978) for
exaip1e argues that "involuntary unemployment is not a fact or
phenomenon which it is the task of theorists to explain". If the
argument that many workers are rationed into low wage jobs is accepted,
it is difficult to see how the argument that some are rationed entirely
out of market work can be rejected. Studying the inter—industry wage
and employment patterns may give insight Into the processes which
generate involuntary unemployment, because the wages of low wage
workers unlike the reservation wages of the unemployed can be observed.
The extraordinary resilience of the inter—industry wage structure at
least challenges the presumption that flexible wages adjust to
eliminate unemployment over short periods of time.
The significance of the finding of inter—industry wage
differentials for macroeconomic theory goes beyond the fact that they
are analogous to involuntary unemployment. As Harris and Todaro (1970)DATA APPENDIX
The data for international wage comparisons are reported in the ILO
Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1983). The following table describes the

































































Allworkers 1982in considering development issues were the first to stress, wage
differentials may themselves be a source of unemployment. Where wages
differ individuals have an incentive to remain unemployed and queue for
jobs. And employers have incentives to act in ways which perpetuate
involuntary unemployment.To take one example, it is a cliche that
employers often turn away overqualified workers. Why? Probably the
most plausible reason is the justified suspicion that they will soon
leave for higher wage eniployment and force thei to again incur the
costs of hiring and training a new worker. If all employers offered
workers of a given quality the same wage, such considerations could not
arise.
Future research should concentrate on the measurement and
explanation of inter—industry wage differences. Existing empirical
work has been much more successful In ruling out some explanations than
in supporting others. Theoretical work has been ingenious in
demonstrating that implications of wage differentials for optimal
economic policy depend on their source. Progress will ultimately
require the development of theories that account for the regularities
noted here and make additional verifiable predictions. We hope that
this review of the available empirical evidence and its implications
provides a start in this direction, and that others will turn their
attention to the problem of the wage structure.ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
forthcoming 1986).
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